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Since the initial formulation of  a national immigration policy for the
country in 1869, Canada has included a provision of  inadmissibility on the
grounds of  mental and/or physical disabilities. Whereas the provision was creat-
ed with the intention of  excluding from Canada those subjects who were consid-
ered a risk to the genetic integrity of  the nation or ‘unemployable’ because of
their disability, with time the emphasis has shifted to focus on the excessive costs
that the disease or disability would likely place on Canadian medical and social
services, particularly after the passage of  Medicare in 1968. The focus of  this
article will be on the provision as included in the Immigration Act of  1976 since
only after the passage of  the Charter of  Rights and Freedoms in 1982 has the
provision been questioned as discriminatory towards persons with mental or
physical disabilities.
My goal in the following pages is to show the limitations as well as the
potential of  the Charter in addressing issues of  discrimination against persons
with disabilities who also happen to be immigrants (or potential immigrants) to
the country. Because of  what Aiken defines as “residual uncertainty regarding
their status vis –à-vis the Charter,”1 I have not discussed the situation of  immi-
grants outside Canada, thus concentrating only on those who, for various rea-
sons, have been able to reach the country. Indeed, when it comes to applicants
who are outside Canada, there has been significant debate on whether they can
claim Charter protection. According to several liberal immigration scholars, for
example, it is still debatable “whether a community owes any duty to non-mem-
bers or aspiring members who are still outside the community.”2 As the follow-
ing discussion demonstrates, “Canadian courts and jurisprudence have not exact-
ly articulated this conflict”3 either. Voyvodic and Iyioha believe that the conflict
results from the presumption that foreigners seeking admission to Canada are
not invested with ‘rights’ but are instead afforded or denied the ‘privilege’ of
joining the Canadian family.4 By removing any discussion of  rights from the
immigration debate, liberal scholarship makes the latter immune to assessments
based on justice criteria. Immigration law can therefore be considered more or
less charitable or humanitarian, but it remains at all times outside the field of  jus-
tice.5
After a brief  historical introduction on how disability came to be one
of  the protected grounds from discrimination in s. 15 of  the Charter, I will dis-
cuss why this inclusion has not been considered by the courts when assessing
whether the Canadian Immigration Act discriminates against immigrant appli-
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cants with disabilities. Through the analysis of  the lawsuit brought forward by
Dalijeet Singh Deol and the hearing of  the Chesters case, I plan to show how
the state has eluded accusations of  discrimination partly, but not exclusively, by
recourse to s. 1 of  the Charter, the ‘reasonable limits’ clause, and to the overall
tendency of  the justice system to avoid interfering in the political process, partic-
ularly with respect to matters concerning immigration. My hope is that the
ordeals experienced by Mr. Deol and Mrs. Chesters as described in the pages
that follow will reveal to the reader how the lives of  two human beings were
subjected to a process of  humiliation that at times resembled mockery and that
hardly any Canadian citizen would find acceptable in a country referred to, on
the domestic as well as international scene, as ‘the land of  rights and freedoms’.
The focus of  my analysis is the Canadian Immigration Act of  1976 as
it was the legislation in effect at the time the Charter was passed in 1982. The
Act established that:
19. (1) No person shall be granted admission if  he is a member of  any
of  the following classes:
(a) persons who are suffering from any disease, disorder, disability or
other health impairment as a result of  the nature, severity or probable
duration of  which, in the opinion of  a medical officer concurred in by
at least one other medical officer,
(i) they are or are likely to be a danger to public health or to public 
safety, or
(ii) their admission would cause or might reasonably be expected to
cause excessive demands on health or social services.6
It should be noted that the provision has remained almost unaltered in
the subsequent Immigration and Refugee Protection Act that received Royal
Assent on November 1 2001, and is currently in place. This partly resulted from
the general climate following the events of  September 11th, when attention on
the immigration front began shifting to issues of  national security and the fight
against ‘terrorism’. Although the issue has sporadically received media attention,
it appears that in the last decade Canadian society has been mostly concerned
with keeping out criminal elements and has not spent much time thinking about
immigrant applicants with non-communicable diseases or disabilities. On the
other hand, the fact that the provision of  medical admissibility has been upheld
by the courts throughout the last twenty-five years has provided a rationale for
not questioning it, thus making the courts complicit in its maintenance. 
However, it is worthy of  mention that the present law differs in one
major respect from its predecessor as it eliminates the restriction if  the immi-
grant applicant:
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(a) has been determined to be a member of  the family class and to be
the spouse, common-law partner or child of  a sponsor within the
meaning of  the regulation;
(b) has applied for a permanent residence visa as a Convention refugee 
or a person in similar circumstances;
(c) is a protected person; or
(d) is, where prescribed by the regulations, the spouse, common-law
partner, child or other family member or a foreign national referred to
in any of  paragraphs (a) to (c).7
Consequently, the medical admissibility criteria in the 2001 Act neither
apply to spouses and children of  Canadians/permanent residents nor to
refugees. Leaving aside the issue of  refugees, which would require a separate
investigation, the change has originated in an effort to have the law conform to
one of  its long-standing objectives: family reunification.8 Yet, it would be worth-
while to analyze whether the change has resulted in a victory or a defeat for the
applicant: is it really a satisfaction to be assessed not for who you are as an indi-
vidual but for the person sponsoring you? I sincerely doubt that any of  us would
find any gratification in the thought that immigration authorities are more con-
cerned with the right of  a Canadian/permanent resident spouse to live with
his/her partner than with our individual right to enjoy a productive and self-ful-
filling existence in the country of  our choosing. Whereas it is true that the family
category is by definition assessing individuals as part of  a family unit, we need to
question the fact that while all adults have a choice whether to apply as inde-
pendent or sponsored, this choice eludes those with an illness/disability.
In this article, I argue that in light of  the principles embodied in s. 15
of  the Canadian Charter of  Rights and Freedoms, article 19(a)(ii) of  the
Immigration Act, 1976 (and its new version, art. 38(1)(c) of  the Immigration and
Refugee Protection Act) resulted in a policy that was discriminatory in the dis-
tinction it made between medically admissible persons and those who were not
admissible because their health condition or disability might have posed an
excessive demand on Canadian health and social services. I also offer explanation
as to why such an argument has failed to receive endorsement from the courts,
therefore allowing the state to continue discriminating against this particular
equity-seeking group. Drawing on the Foucauldian discourse around biopolitics
and state racism, I attempt to elucidate the reasons behind the maintenance of  a
virtual status quo in immigration legislation while other laws have been revised
and amended to make them compliant with the Charter. 
The Canadian Charter of  Rights and Freedoms is part of  the
Constitution Act that came into force on April 17 1982 under the Liberal gov-
ernment of  Pierre Elliott Trudeau. It replaced the Canadian Bill of  Rights
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passed in 1960 by the Diefenbaker government; whereas the latter was not con-
stitutionally entrenched and applied only to federal legislation, the Charter is part
of  the Constitution and therefore applies to the federal as well as provincial gov-
ernments, also empowering the court system to review and invalidate any law
that is contrary to it. For the first time in Canadian history, s. 15 (1) of  the
Charter unequivocally states that:
Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to
the equal protection and equal benefit of  the law without discrimina-
tion and, in particular, without discrimination based on race, national or
ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.9
Although part of  the Constitution Act, the equality rights guaranteed by the
Charter in s. 15 were put under a moratorium of  three year (see s. 32(2) of  the
Charter) as the federal and provincial governments needed the time to review
existing laws and amend them in case they conflicted with s. 15.10 Yet, as already
mentioned, the Immigration Act was not among the laws to be reviewed and
amended.
The Charter was reflective of  a new attitude towards issues of  equality
and rights that went beyond the mere legal sphere to touch every aspect of  soci-
ety. The passage of  the Charter, and in particular its s. 15, represents a milestone
for the recognition of  rights for persons with disabilities within Canadian society.
Sarah Armstrong explains that the Charter “became the first constitution to
guarantee a right to equality for persons with disabilities.”11 And yet, when s. 15
was introduced in Parliament in October 1980, it made no reference to persons
with disabilities. The exclusion was strongly opposed by the disability community
on three different fronts: in the media and in public debates over patriation, in
discussions of  the Special Committee of  the House of  Commons on the
Disabled and the Handicapped, also known as the Parliamentary Handicap
Committee, and in presentations to the Special Joint Committee of  the Senate
and House of  Commons on the Constitution of  Canada (the Hays-Joyal
Committee).12 While the disability community advocated for the constitutional
recognition of  the right to equality for persons with disabilities, the federal gov-
ernment actively resisted the idea of  having mental and physical disability added
to s. 15. Minister of  Justice Jean Chrétien argued that there were three main
objections to including the disabled among the protected groups. First, the
courts were already in a position to intervene if  a person with disability was dis-
criminated. Second, there was no clear definition in Canadian society of  who
were those covered by the term disability. Finally, there was no real need to pro-
tect disability rights under the constitution as the provinces already had effective
human rights codes.13 Another objection never clearly stated but always hinted
at, was that it would be too expensive to fund new services that might be
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required by the Charter. However, “[a]t no point did the government present sta-
tistical or factual support for the claim that including disability in section 15
would cost too much money.”14 Before the Hays-Joyal Committee, several
organizations such as the Coalition of  Provincial Organizations of  the
Handicapped (COPOH),15 the Canadian Association for the Mentally Retarded
(CAMR) and the Canadian National Institute for the Blind (CNIB) contested the
government’s position. They argued that “the cost argument was untenable, first,
because the argument itself  was unsupported … and, second, because disability
was the only ground of  discrimination to which this cost-benefit analysis was
being applied.”16 A similar argument is applicable to the medical admissibility
provision in the Immigration Act of  1976 and in the current Immigration and
Refugee Protection Act. Ireh Iyioha refers to several research studies indicating
that despite the persistence of  the common view that immigrants are depleting
Canadian healthcare resources, they are actually underutilizing them.17
In the fight to have disability included in the Charter, it certainly played
to the advantage of  the disability rights’ advocates that the debate took place in
the United Nations International Year of  Disabled Persons. Yvonne Peters
recalls that Canada had been one of  the co-movers of  the United Nations reso-
lution that had designated the year 1981 as the International Year of  Disabled
Persons.18 Equally significant, the theme chosen for the UN International Year
of  Disabled Persons was “Equality and Full Participation.”19 Given these prem-
ises, it became difficult to justify the refusal to entrench the rights of  persons
with disabilities into the new Constitution while at the same time supporting the
principles of  full participation and equality entrenched in the United Nations
resolution.20 In the end, the government capitulated and on January 28 1981
“Canada added both mental and physical disability to the list of  specifically pro-
tected groups in sections 15(1) and 15(2) of  the Charter.”21 Providing persons
with disabilities with constitutional recognition of  their right to equality magni-
fied their impact on society. For the first time, they found themselves in posses-
sion of  a new legal tool in the quest for equality. Armstrong remarks that
“[s]ince the enactment of  the Charter, groups representing people with disabili-
ties have repeatedly intervened in equality rights cases to persuade the courts to
adopt this vision of  substantive equality.”22 Although the courts have not always
adopted a progressive view of  the Charter (and here ‘progressive’ refers to the
active protection of  minority rights that are overlooked in the ordinary process
of  majoritarian democracy), it remains true that it has been extremely empower-
ing to finally have a voice in the Supreme Court.23 Indeed, Armstrong notes that
“[t]he potential for interest advocacy under the Charter has given disability
groups significant new opportunities to influence the development of  the law
and public opinion on fundamental disability issues.”24 If  recourse to the courts
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has rarely presented persons with disabilities with the expected outcomes, it has
nonetheless given them a resource to reach out to and has created a lively debate
within the broader society. Whereas I agree with Mandel that the Charter, born
under the auspices of  transferring power to the people, has most often merely
transferred power to those in the legal profession,25 I also believe that its reach
has gone beyond the legal sphere, thus making it a document Canadians cele-
brate as symbolic of  their identity.
At its most basic the Charter has allowed advocacy groups and individ-
uals to use the document as a legal tool in the courts in order to advance their
claims since 1985. In the 1989 decision in Andrew v. Law Society of  British
Columbia, the Supreme Court of  Canada, in the person of  Justice McIntyre, ruled
that the Charter’s protection extends to persons who are neither Canadian citi-
zens nor permanent residents. In explaining the ruling, McIntyre “maintained
that non-citizens are a minority group analogous to those enumerated under the
grounds of  s. 15 and that they come within the protection of  s. 15.”26 The
Court decision opened a new avenue for immigrant applicants to fight those
provisions of  the Immigration Act that were discriminatory. In particular, the
Charter appears to have the potential for strongly impacting the medical admissi-
bility provision. While it is true that its application is restricted to the Canadian
territory,27 it should be noted that several individuals applying to permanently
immigrate are already in Canada, for instance holders of  working or study visa
permits and individuals who have received a ministerial permit. Whereas claims
of  discrimination by private individuals or groups are usually handled under
statutory human rights laws, discrimination by government (such as government
laws and policies) is under the purview of  the Charter and human rights acts.28
Given the significance of  the Charter for the advancement of  disability rights
within the country, it is important to reflect on the way it has been used in the
courts by advocacy organizations and those directly affected by the medical
admissibility provision. 
This article originated in an investigation I conducted as part of  my
doctoral thesis on the historical development of  public discourse around immi-
grant medical admissibility in Canada. My work explored the public discourse
entertained by different societal actors such as Parliament, the press, and the
judicial system; one of  the chapters analyzed several court cases related to the
medical admissibility provision contained in the Canadian Immigration Act of
1976 and their relation to the Charter of  Rights and Freedoms.29 By examining
how these cases were presented and discussed in courts, I intended to demon-
strate that the provision in question was discriminatory and unconstitutional
under s. 15 of  the Canadian Charter of  Rights and Freedoms. I was also
attempting to shed light on the policy adopted by the state on the subject of
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medically inadmissible immigrants. In order to investigate the role played by the
Charter in questioning the section of  the Immigration Act dealing with potential
immigrants considered inadmissible due to health conditions or disabilities, I
decided to focus on seventeen cases brought to the Federal Court and the
Supreme Court of  Canada by the plaintiffs to contest the Immigration
Department’s decision to refuse them or their family members’ entrance into the
country. The earliest lawsuit among those investigated was heard in May 1988
while the latest was heard in February 2005. Two of  the cases reached the
Supreme Court. All others were dealt with by the Federal Court of  Canada.30
At the beginning of  the investigation, I expected that most of  the cases
would directly engage with s. 15 of  the Charter. After all, the equality clause is
the first to come to mind when dealing with issues of  discrimination by the gov-
ernment against individuals belonging to equity seeking groups. It was therefore
puzzling to find out that only two of  the seventeen cases made explicit reference
to the Charter while all the others contested the decision without actually ques-
tioning the existing law; in each instance, the plaintiff  merely argued that the
provision did not apply to the specific situation under review. Despite the initial
ambiguity, I believe that there is a subtle connection between the way the cases
were conducted and the Charter. It appears likely that faced with the argument
repeatedly put forth by the defense and accepted by the courts that the medical
admissibility clause does not refer to persons with disabilities but focuses instead
on excessive demand, the plaintiffs were forced to shift their focal point away
from disability and concentrate their attention on showing they were not likely to
pose excessive demand on Canadian health and social services. In so doing,
while contesting in a tangential way the discriminatory nature of  the legislation
under the Charter, the core of  their argument eluded the issue. Furthermore, it
should be considered that Charter cases are expensive and rarely successful,
therefore the silence around the Charter could be also explained as a simple liti-
gation strategy. Finally, as previously noted, the application of  the Charter to
‘foreigners’ is contested in the academy as well as in the legal domain, this con-
stituting a disincentive for claimants.
The only two exceptions to this trend were represented by the lawsuit
brought forward by Dalijeet Singh Deol in 1992 and by the hearing of  Angela
Chesters in 2001. For this reason, both cases are analyzed in this paper. The
Deol case touches on the Charter only tangentially but deserves mention, as it
constitutes one of  the first direct references to the Charter in a court proceeding
dealing with immigration to Canada. The Chesters hearing is the most significant
and groundbreaking since Mrs. Chesters maintained that the medical admissibili-
ty provision was unconstitutional as it offended s. 15 of  the Charter in discrimi-
nating against persons with disabilities. Although unsuccessful, the hearing is of
paramount importance to understanding the potential impact the Charter might
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have on the way the Canadian state relates to inadmissible immigrant applicants. 
On November 25 1992, the Federal Court of  Appeal in the person of
Justices MacGuigan, Linden and Robertson, heard the case of  Deol v. Canada
(Minister of  Employment and Immigration). The appeal was directed against the deci-
sion of  the Immigration and Refugee Board dismissing a previous appeal from
the immigration officer’s refusal of  a sponsored application. In that circum-
stance, the appellant’s mother and her two dependant daughters had been
refused entrance into Canada on the grounds that one of  the daughters was
diagnosed with mental retardation and could reasonably be expected to cause
excessive demands on health and social services. The appellant contested the
Board’s decision on the basis of  both validity and equity. In the judgment deliv-
ered on November 27 1992, Justice MacGuigan allowed the appeal and ordered
the matter returned to a differently constituted panel for rehearing and redeter-
mination. While recognizing that the Board cannot question a medical diagnosis,
MacGuigan declared, “it should inquire into the reasonableness of  their [the
medical officers’] conclusion as to the probable demands on government servic-
es. In the case at bar … … the Board did not inquire into the reasonableness of
the medical officers’ conclusion, but rather assumed … that the conclusion was
reasonable.”31
In contesting the validity of  the Board’s decision, the appellant also
argued that the Board was wrong in establishing that the onus of  proof  had to
be placed on the applicant. Given that mental retardation was a form of  mental
disability and therefore was an enumerated ground of  discrimination under s.
15(1) of  the Charter, Deol maintained that any justification had to be made
under s. 1 of  the Charter, which reads:
The Canadian Charter of  Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and
freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed
by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.
32
Accordingly, Deol claimed that the onus was on the government. Deol’s claim
rested on the understanding that any limitations to the rights and freedoms guar-
anteed by the Charter must be justified by the party asserting it, namely the fed-
eral or provincial government. If  indeed the onus remained on the citizen, he or
she would have, as pointed out by the Honourable Fogarty, to literally “fight for
his or her rights”33 and this would make the Charter a useless instrument and
the intended protection of  the rights and freedoms of  individuals a mere pre-
tence.34 Justice MacGuigan rejected the argument since it contradicted s. 8(1) of
the Immigration Act, which explicitly placed the burden of  proof  on the person
seeking entrance into Canada. Nevertheless, the court decided to allow the
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appeal as the Board failed to take into account the nature and degree of  the
mental retardation as well as humanitarian and compassionate considerations
such as “close bonds of  affection that may arise in such a family.”35 In so doing,
the Board ignored the intention of  the Immigration Act to facilitate family
reunification. 
Deol v. Canada is significant in the context of  this article insofar as the
appellant made a direct albeit minor reference to s. 15 of  the Charter. Justice
MacGuigan acknowledged that the issue had never before been argued in front
of  the court. However, in a questionable decision, he maintained that the con-
tention was inconsequential as s. 8(1) of  the Immigration Act had precedence
over the Charter. As shown in the following pages, while the Charter is an inte-
gral part of  the Canadian constitution and is therefore, as clearly stated in s.
52(1) of  the Constitution Act, the most important law in the country, the courts
have often acted erratically in their conclusions. They have refused to acknowl-
edge the incongruity existing between the Charter and several of  Canada’s laws.
Particularly with respect to immigration, the courts’ unwillingness to examine
whether immigration policy conforms to principles of  universal justice, has
allowed the state to operate under what Voyvodic defines as “wasteland.”36
Similarly, Agamben refers to ‘state of  exception’, a blind juridico-institutional
spot where the state can ignore its own laws in the name of  ‘necessity’.37 In the
case under study, the state continues excluding immigrant applicants with disabil-
ities although the exclusion patently violates its commitment to non-discrimina-
tion on grounds of  disability. The courts appear complicit in this process of  dis-
crimination as their lack of  acknowledgment of  such violation only helps in
legitimizing it.
As noted above, almost all of  the immigration lawsuits brought to
court in those years failed to make direct reference to the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms. Instead of  questioning the law as unconstitutional because
in violation of  s. 15 of  the Charter, the litigations simply cast doubts on the cor-
rectness of  applying the medical admissibility provision to the specific circum-
stances of  the appellants. It is curious that at a moment when “the Charter has
invigorated the struggles of  groups that represent people with disabilities,”38 ref-
erences to the Charter were absent in the overwhelming majority of  legal cases
dealing with individuals who had been refused admission into Canada because of
mental or physical disabilities. Most likely this occurred because legal counsels
were of  the opinion that questioning the constitutionality of  the Immigration
Act was not going to be successful in court. In fact, there were two major obsta-
cles to overcome: the government’s claim that the issue at stake was not disability
but excessive demands created by disability, and the fact that s. 1 of  the Charter
establishes that rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Charter itself  are not
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unconditional but subject to reasonable limits (and again, what is or is not rea-
sonable is a matter of  interpretation) prescribed by the law. 
Equally important is to consider that, as pointed out by Evelyn Kallen
in Ethnicity and Human Rights in Canada, “individuals or organizations bringing
complaints under the Charter must pay for the costs involved.”39 Recognizing
that costs can be prohibitive, especially for persons belonging to disadvantaged
minorities, the federal government had initially set aside some funding for
“selected ‘Charter Challenge’ court cases at the federal level. However, this pro-
gram was discontinued in 1992.”40 While axed by the Conservative Mulroney
government, the program was revived by the Liberals when they came to power
in 1993. However, after being criticized for years by social conservatives and crit-
ics of  judicial activism for providing groups with the money to go to court and
thus circumvent the will of  Parliament, the program has since then been killed
once again in the fall of  2007 by the Conservative government of  Stephen
Harper. As a result, many persons have been prevented from pursuing the
option of  using the Charter for the protection and recognition of  their rights.
The high costs involved in bringing Charter claims forward have made the docu-
ment inaccessible to those needing it most. If  not for the subsidies provided by
organizations advocating on issues of  rights and equity, and the benevolence of
some lawyers to bankroll cases, the Charter would remain a luxury many cannot
afford.
Despite these difficulties, in 2001 Angela Chesters, a German citizen
married to a Canadian, challenged as unconstitutional the visa officer’s decision
to refuse her permanent resident status under the ‘family class’ category on the
basis that she had multiple sclerosis (MS) and was therefore likely to cause exces-
sive demands on health and social services. Her case represents the first serious
attempt at questioning the medical admissibility provision contained in the
Immigration Act as unlawful because it violation of  s. 15 of  the Charter. It is
also noteworthy because of  the publicity it received and the debate it generated
in Canadian society at large. The fact that the effort to prove the unconstitution-
ality of  the Act did not succeed speaks volumes about the way Canadian law
approaches issues of  immigration and disability. It further reveals some of  the
limitations of  the Charter on the issue of  equality rights. At the same time read-
ers should keep in mind that as unique and remarkable as it is, Angela Chesters’
case highlights a state policy on immigrants with disabilities that has been at
work for more than a century and has affected a large number of  people who
have remained anonymous, never getting the attention of  the media or Canadian
society more widely. The focus should therefore remain on a long-lasting process
of  exclusion rather than on a single figure of  note.
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In December 1991, Angela Chesters, a German citizen holding Masters’
degrees in both History and Science and Information Technology, married
Robin Chesters, a native of  South Africa who had subsequently acquired
Canadian citizenship. In September of  that year, Mrs. Chesters was diagnosed
with MS and by the end of  1993 she was using a wheelchair. At that time, the
couple lived in England. In 1994, they decided to move to Canada and Mrs.
Chesters submitted an application for permanent residence as a member of  the
family class. On 14 November 1994, Robin Chesters received a telephone call
from Mr. Ernest Alston, visa officer at the Canadian High Commission in
London (where Angela had submitted her application) informing him that his
wife had been determined to be medically inadmissible to Canada under s.
19(1)(a)(ii) of  the Immigration Act. Mr. Alston advised Mr. Chesters to investi-
gate the possibility of  obtaining a ministerial permit allowing Mrs. Chesters to
enter the country. Under a ministerial permit (today’s Temporary Resident
Permit), immigrants are allowed to enter and remain in the country for a limited
period of  time usually not exceeding three years. By then, the couple was already
living in Canada since Mrs. Chesters had received a visitor’s visa in the summer
1994. In April 1995, Angela Chesters was issued a ministerial permit valid for
three years. The following year, however, she moved back to Germany to work
and was joined by her husband in February 1999. After receiving a negative
response from immigration authorities, Mrs. Chesters did not pursue an applica-
tion for judicial review but decided to challenge the constitutionality of  s.
19(1)(a)(ii) by way of  action. This was done through the issuance of  a statement
of  claim on April 2 1997 (an amended statement was filed on July 29 of  the
same year).41
Angela Chesters commenced her action in 1997. On August 30 2000,
the Minister of  Citizenship and Immigration made an offer in writing to settle
the proceeding, which included landing for the plaintiff. However, on September
27 2000, Mrs. Chester rejected the offer believing that it had been made to
silence her and avoid having the court assess the constitutionality of  the provi-
sion. On the basis that the offer had not been accepted, the court dismissed the
claim advanced by Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC) that the issue
before the court was moot, as there was no ‘live controversy’ between the parties
to the litigation. The rationale behind the dismissal is that the court has compe-
tence to resolve legal disputes within an adversarial system and this cannot be
done without the existence of  a true adversarial context. In spite of  this, the
court still has authority to hear a case when the latter involves collateral conse-
quences for the litigants. The court can also refuse dismissal when there is an
intervener with a stake in the outcome of  the litigation. As pointed out by
Justice Dawson, there were valid reasons for the court to hear the case brought
forward by Angela Chesters. Dawson noted that the plaintiff ’s request was for a
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declaration that s. 19(1)(a)(ii) was inconsistent with s. 7 and s. 15 of  the Charter.
Hence, 
While at the end of  the day the plaintiff  certainly may hope to be land-
ed (and I note parenthetically to be landed by right and not by the
defendant's largesse as reflected in a settlement offer), it remains that
the plaintiff's action does not directly put landing in issue and is not
limited to a claim for landing.42
In December 2001, CIC asked for summary judgment and repeated its request
to have the issue declared as moot since a new Immigration and Refugee
Protection Act had been given Royal Assent on November 1 2001 (though it had
not yet come into force). According to the new Act, Mrs. Chesters “would no
longer be medically inadmissible under subsection 38(2) of  the new legisla-
tion.”43 In fact, the section referred to by CIC establishes that the medical
admissibility provision does not apply to persons who are refugees or spouses,
common law partners or children of  a Canadian citizen or permanent resident.
After due consideration, Justice Lufty dismissed the motion once again on the
grounds that: 
The plaintiff's action is grounded on the current legislation, not on the
new Immigration and Refugee Protection Act which has yet to come into
force. In his letter to the Court dated December 4, 2001, counsel for
the plaintiff  stated that the new legislation has no impact on this litiga-
tion.44
In refusing to have the case dismissed for mootness, the court also con-
sidered that, by order dated February 20 2001, Prothonotary45 Lafreniere grant-
ed intervener status to the Council of  Canadians with Disabilities (CCD), a
national not-for-profit organization representing persons with disabilities. On
February 27 2001, the CCD made a written submission to the court arguing that
it was important to adjudicate on the issue of  constitutionality of  s. 19(1)(a)(ii)
since the provision contributed “to the pervasive negative stereotype of  persons
with disabilities, including those who are permanent residents of  Canada, as a
drain on society.”46 The organization maintained that for years the Department
of  Citizenship and Immigration had attempted to avoid having the constitution-
ality of  the Act adjudicated in court by issuing ministerial permits to individuals
who had initiated a Charter challenge. The consequence had been that “[t]hose
who are desperate for permanent status in Canada usually do not have the
resilience to see a case through its conclusion when tempted by the blandish-
ment of  a Minister’s Permit.”47 The department’s successful attempts in termi-
nating litigations had resulted in the continuation of  a practice that was discrimi-
natory at its roots. Accordingly, the CCD insisted:
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The issue at the core of  this case: the constitutionality of  section
19(1)(a) of  the Act, is regarded by the CCD as an issue of  national
importance. This is not only because of  its impact on persons with dis-
abilities from abroad, who would be welcomed as new Canadians were
it not for their disability; but of  equal importance is its discriminatory
impact upon Canadians with disabilities who are stigmatized by this leg-
islation’s failure to recognize that disabled people make contributions to
Canadian society.48
On June 27 2002, in her submissions to the court, Angela Chesters
argued that she was discriminated against on the basis of  her medical condition
“which was improperly categorized by Canadian immigration officials as a dis-
ability.”49 She therefore challenged the constitutionality of  s. 19(1)(a)(ii) on the
grounds that it contravened s. 7, guaranteeing life, liberty and security of  the per-
son, and s. 15 of  the Charter. According to Mrs. Chesters, s. 7 was violated
because she was placed in a situation of  uncertainty which resulted in high levels
of  mental and psychological stress. More importantly, s. 15 was offended as she
had been singled out as belonging to a class of  persons who were explicitly pro-
tected by that section. She maintained that even “if  the provision is not discrimi-
natory on its face, then it still breaches the guarantee of  equality because it has
an adverse discriminatory effect. It improperly impacts upon a distinct group of
people who are already vulnerable to discrimination.”50 Mrs. Chesters’ arguments
were also adopted by the intervener, the Council of  Canadians with Disabilities.
Additionally, the CCD submitted that the medical admissibility provision was
“further flawed by failing to address the potential contribution to be made to
Canada by persons suffering from disabilities.”51
In presenting its case, CIC maintained that s. 19(1)(a)(ii) did not offend
s. 7 and s. 15 of  the Charter and was, in any event, justifiable under s. 1. Canada
had both the right and obligation to set standards for entry into the country, and
subparagraph 19(1)(a)(ii) was meant to accomplish that objective by protecting
Canadian health and social services against excessive demands. CIC denied Mrs.
Chesters’ claim that the department’s actions had resulted in a breach of  s. 7 of
the Charter since levels of  stress are to be assessed objectively and that section
was never intended to “protect an individual from the ordinary anxiety that
would be felt by a person of  reasonable sensibility, as the result of  government
action.”52 As for s. 15 of  the Charter, CIC relied on a previous decision reached
in 1999 by the Supreme Court in Law v. Canada (Minister of  Citizenship and
Immigration) where the court identified three steps to be followed when assessing
whether s. 15 of  the Charter had been breached. The first step was to look at an
appropriate comparator group receiving a different treatment from the plaintiff.
Whereas Angela Chesters argued that a distinction had been made between able-
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bodied and disabled spouses of  Canadian citizens who applied for permanent
residence, CIC responded that the distinction to be considered was the one
between persons who were medically admissible and those who were not. The
second step consisted in assessing whether the distinction had been based upon
the enumerated grounds of  disability. Contesting Chesters’ argument, CIC stated
that the distinction had no relation to disability but was exclusively based on the
concept of  ‘excessive demands’. Finally, the third step looked at discrimination
based on stereotypical reasoning. CIC argued that the plaintiff  was “assessed on
a personalized basis”53 and therefore there had been no stereotypical reasoning
behind the visa officer’s rejection.
In giving the reasons for the court order, Justice Heneghan began by
stating that “[i]t is well-settled law that not every differential treatment gives rise
to discrimination.”54 He then proceeded to assess whether discrimination had
taken place in the case brought forward by Angela Chesters. For that purpose, he
heavily relied on the three steps process outlined in Law v. Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration) and previously referred to by the respondent. On the
question of  a proper comparator group, Justice Heneghan concluded that Mrs.
Chesters had sought admission to Canada as member of  the family class; accord-
ingly, the family class and not able-bodied spouses of  Canadian citizens was the
appropriate comparator group. Accepting the department argument, the court
interpreted s. 19(1)(a)(ii) as focusing on excessive demands rather than disability.
Justice Heneghan pointed out, “[s]ubparagraph 19(1)(a)(ii) is not directed to any
of  the specified grounds in subsection 15(1) of  the Charter. It is directed to
excessive demands.”55 The Act had the purpose of  protecting Canada against
excessive demands and “that purpose is apparent even if  the words “disease”,
“disorder” or “disability” are deleted.”56 Justice Heneghan’s reasoning for choos-
ing the family class as comparator group appears questionable. Dale Gibson
explains that, under Charter jurisprudence, the “ambit of  the comparison group
is … no longer capable of  being defined by the law itself ”57 (in this case, the
Canadian Immigration Act), but depends on “who is complaining and what they
are complaining about.”58 It is quite clear that Angela Chesters was not com-
plaining about the law itself  but the way it was applied to a subgroup of  the
applicant population, namely persons with disabilities. As remarked by Justice
McIntyre in Andrew v. Law Society of  British Columbia, to ignore that a similar treat-
ment can actually result in the discrimination of  certain individuals,59 is deceitful
at best.
Remarking that entry into Canada is a privilege rather than a right,
Justice Heneghan concluded,
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The section in question focuses on excessive demands, not on disease,
disorder or disability. Contrary to the stance taken by the plaintiff, this
case is not about disability but the medical assessment of  potential
immigrants to Canada within the context of  Canadian immigration law.
By its nature, legislation governing immigration must be selective…
The process of  assessing medical examinations for the purpose of
determining excessive demands upon existing Canadian health services
is an aspect of  the screening process … In my opinion, this is not
within the enumerated grounds of  subsection 15(1) nor is it analogous
to it.60
With respect to the plaintiff ’s claim that the actions of  the state had put her in a
situation of  uncertainty, which resulted in high levels of  psychological stress,
thus contravening the guarantee of  life, liberty and security of  the person under
s. 7 of  the Charter, the court dismissed the argument as well. Stating, “the con-
stitutional guarantee of  security of  the person does not protect against ‘ordinary
stresses and anxieties that a person of  reasonable sensibility would suffer as a
result of  government action’,”61 the court decided that,
the plaintiff ’s right to security of  the person was not infringed in con-
sequence of  the application of  the inadmissibility section. She was not
the victim of  state action. As a potential immigrant, she was subject to
meeting the requirements of  the Immigration Act and Regulations.62
Accordingly, the action was dismissed as “subparagraph 19(1)(a)(ii) offends nei-
ther subsection 15(1) of  the Charter nor section 7.”63
The court did not address any of  the submissions presented by the
intervener, the Council of  Canadians with Disabilities. In particular, the court
failed to address the intervener’s criticism that the medical admissibility provision
did not balance the potential contributions to Canadian society of  persons with
disabilities or illnesses against expected costs to health and social services. On
that issue, Justice Heneghan chose to remain silent. Sarah Armstrong observes
that several scholars have repeatedly indicated that the judicial system is inherent-
ly conservative and the courts are more likely to uphold the status quo than vali-
date a progressive interpretation of  the Charter.64 This occurs in particular when
decisions are related to immigration.65 Catherine Dauvergne maintains that
“migration decision-making” is characterized by both “[e]xecutive discretion and
judicial deference,” this being demonstrated by “the scant impact which the
Canadian Charter of  Rights and Freedoms has had on immigration and refugee
law.”66 The court decision in the case of  Angela Chesters confirms Dauvergne’s
interpretation. On the other hand, in a number of  cases, the courts have played a
significant role “in safeguarding minority rights overlooked in the ordinary
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processes of  majoritarian democracy.”67 While the assumption that “once the
rights of  people are enshrined in Canada’s Charter of  Rights and Freedoms, they
are implemented as a matter of  course”68 is patently false, I am convinced that
the Charter represents a valuable tool in the advancement and protection of
minority rights within the judicial system. With reference to individuals with
mental or physical disabilities, their inclusion in s. 15 of  the Charter has repre-
sented a victory in their struggle for recognition. More importantly, it has finally
given them a voice.
It is also interesting to note that, as it emerges in the 2002 decision in
Chesters v. Canada, the question of  excessive demands is still asked exclusively in
relation to immigrant applicants with diseases or disabilities despite the fact that
other groups as well could potentially result in high costs for the Canadian econ-
omy. In giving its judgment in the Chesters’ case, the court maintained that the
medical admissibility provision was not discriminatory as its intention was to
protect the state against the possibility of  excessive demands created by some
individuals. In particular, the court pointed out that the purpose of  the provision
was evident whether or not explicit references to disease, disorder or disability
were made in its wording. However, the court’s argument was flawed as it failed
to consider that, should those words be deleted, the provision could be used to
keep out of  the country also heavy drinkers, smokers or aged people, all cate-
gories that could likely be expected to pose excessive demands on health and
social services. The court’s rationale did not account for the fact that the
Department of  Citizenship and Immigration appears to pay no attention to such
categories while it keeps focusing on individuals with diseases and/or disabilities.
This paper has presented two cases illustrating the way the Charter has
been used in the courts to contest the medical admissibility provision contained
in the Canadian Immigration Act of  1976. In so doing, it has demonstrated that
to date the argument that the provision is incompatible with the Charter and
should therefore be revised, has not resonated well with the courts. Looking in
particular at the reasoning provided by the judicial system in dismissing the
action brought forward by Angela Chesters, there seem to be two possible expla-
nations for the court’s refusal to consider the provision in violation of  the
Charter. The first and most simplistic explanation is the one presented by CIC in
the Chesters case, namely that the provision in question does not refer to disabil-
ity but focuses on the issue of  excessive demand. The court accepted this rea-
soning and, in the words of  Justice Heneghan, maintained that “[s]ubparagraph
19(1)(a)(ii) is not directed to any of  the specified grounds in subsection 15(1) of
the Charter. It is directed to excessive demands.”69 Accordingly, the provision
would stand “even if  the words “disease”, “disorder” or “disability” are
deleted.”70 Such an argument has little credibility since, as previously noted,
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should those words be deleted, the provision could also be used to keep out of
the country other groups likely to pose excessive demands on health and social
services. Instead, the Department of  Citizenship and Immigration has decided
to focus exclusively on individuals with diseases and/or disabilities. As long as a
convincing justification for this targeting of  a specific group continues to be
missing, both the government’s argument and the court validation of  it are
groundless.
The second possible explanation for ignoring the accusation of  uncon-
stitutionality of  the medical admissibility provision is based on a more complex
rationale. In can be summarized by arguing that the application of  the Charter is
not without limits. Indeed, s. 1 makes clear that rights and freedoms guaranteed
by the Charter are subject to “such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.”71 It could be argued
that limits are reasonable and demonstrably justified in the case of  potential
immigrants who are expected to pose excessive demands on the system.
However, there are two major problems with this argument. First, as noted by
the Honourable Fogarty, “[t]he term “reasonable” presents a vague concept.”72
According to the Webster Dictionary, reasonable means “being in accordance
with reason,”73 but this still does not help in assessing whether or not excluding
persons with diseases or disabilities from immigrating to the country is actually
in accordance with reason any more than accepting heavy drinkers or smokers.
Secondly, the reference to a limit that is “demonstrably justified” also raises sev-
eral questions. The use of  the term “demonstrably” indicates that the onus of
justifying the limit is on the government (in this case, on the Department of
Citizenship and Immigration). Yet, as pointed out in 1992 by Jerome Di
Giovanni, then Secretary of  the Canadian Disability Rights Council, during his
intervention in front of  the Parliamentary Committee created to discuss Bill C-
86, A Measure to Amend the Immigration Act, “No government, be it
Conservative or Liberal, has ever managed to demonstrate that disabled persons
were an excessive burden on Canadian society.”74 As of  today, Di Giovanni’s
statement remains true. Consequently, as the limits imposed on the rights and
freedoms guaranteed by the Charter to immigrants with diseases or disabilities
have not been demonstrably justified, s. 1 cannot be called upon in dismissing
claims of  unconstitutionality of  the medical admissibility provision.
As I have tried to demonstrate, the courts have erred in their interpreta-
tion of  the Charter when dealing with claim of  unconstitutionality of  the med-
ical admissibility provision. Different Justices have so far been quite reluctant to
address questions of  unconstitutionality, thus confirming the arguments of  vari-
ous scholars who maintain the judicial structure tends to uphold intact the exist-
ing system.75 It would be worthwhile to conduct a thorough examination of  the
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reasons behind such a stance, beginning with considering to what extent this is a
reaction to accusations repeatedly addressed to the courts of  attempting to
bypass the democratic process and reverse Parliament’s decisions. Michael
Mandel, for example, refers to judges as “elected by and accountable to nobody.
Not only accountable to nobody, but also lacking any formal restraints.”76 Allan
C. Hutchinson accuses judges and lawyers of  being “a professional elite that can
have no claim to constitutional priority over democratic deliberation.”77
According to Hutchinson, constitutional supremacy has resulted in judicial
supremacy, thus bringing Charter issues out of  the “political forum of  demo-
cratic debate and into the legal arena of  judicial pronouncement.”78 The most
detrimental outcome of  this process is the decrease in active participation among
the population, with citizens transformed into passive subjects.79 Although in a
more nuanced form, Manfredi appears to share this view when suggesting that
“[w]e might be better off  rediscovering the value of  the public realm of
politics”80 rather than expecting the judiciary to solve all of  society’s problems
around issues of  liberty, equality and social justice. Unfortunately, while contain-
ing elements of  truths, especially with respect to the contentions that any legal
interpretation is political and that so far courts’ decisions have not been particu-
larly progressive,81 the argument against juridical intervention looks weak.
Hutchinson’s call for “dialogic democracy,”82 an alternative space where tensions
can be recomposed through negotiation between the parts, seems utopic at best
as it fails to give due consideration to the fact that the players involved have dif-
ferent degrees of  power, making the field decidedly uneven.
This paper has also revealed the state policy on the issue of  medically
inadmissible immigrants. It has shown that, even within the context of  the
Charter, the decision to reject those individuals who are not healthy and ‘fully
functional’ according to society’s standards continues to stand. The question
therefore is: how is it possible that the state successfully ignores its own laws? In
order to answer this question it is important to situate the discussion around
immigration within the Foucauldian discourse of  biopolitics and state racism. In
“The Child-Citizen,” Xiaobei Chen reminds the reader that “[b]iopolitical logics
are premised on a conception of  a population as a mass of  living beings whose
existence and well being are of  fundamental concern to the state.”83 As
explained by Foucault, the focus of  biopolitics is “the population as a political
problem.”84 Within this framework, illness holds a central place insofar as it is
understood as “phenomena affecting a population.”85 On the other hand, the
state uses state racism to “pose questions of  biopower and sovereign power at
the same time – determining who is to be excluded, rejected or removed – as to
improve the happiness and health of  the population.”86 If, following Agamben’s
argument, we admit that “Western politics is a biopolitics from the very begin-
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ning,” and that this renders futile “any attempt to found political liberties in the
rights of  the citizens,”87 we must recognize that such a statement applies even
more to those who lack citizenship and are still perceived as foreigners. It
becomes therefore apparent that exclusion of  certain subjects gets justified by
the state as a process that must take precedence over any other laws, even over
the constitution of  the land. Under this logic, the medical admissibility provision
is perfectly justified and cannot be questioned by recourse to the Charter. 
As shown by the case of  Angela Chesters and by the analysis in this
paper, the Charter’s application in the courts is no panacea. The judiciary tends
to have a very conservative approach to the equality clause and appears inclined
to uphold the status quo while the state continues to have a somewhat ethically
questionable but still unchallenged argument. Nevertheless, the Charter repre-
sents a revolutionary tool in the hand of  minority groups. With respect to the
issue dealt with in this paper, the applicability of  the Charter to every person
who is on Canadian soil, no matter whether Canadian or not, has a potential that
has not yet been fully explored and exploited. In particular, it brings into relief
the issue of  human rights guaranteed to every individual irrespective of  national-
ity. In 1951, Hannah Arendt wrote in The Origins of  Totalitarianism that, “general
human rights, as distinguished from the rights of  citizens” “proved to be unen-
forceable.”88 Arendt’s argument has recently been echoed by Giorgio Agamben
who maintains that the notion of  human rights “is inconceivable in the law of
the nation-state,”89 and that there are no rights outside those bestowed upon cit-
izens. The Charter seems to represent the first serious attempt to invalidate such
arguments. Whereas still tied to the notion of  a nation state (as the document is
enforceable only within the Canadian sovereign space), the fact that it applies to
every human being physically in Canada without consideration for the individ-
ual’s nationality, renders the Charter a revolutionary tool of  unprecedented pro-
portions. The refusal of  the court in 2002 to engage with the criticism brought
forward by the Council of  Canadians with Disabilities is visible proof  that many
of  the implications of  the Charter have so far simply been disregarded.
However, disregard is not dismissal. These same issues will likely resurface again,
and sooner or later the court will be forced to face them.
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